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Some of these observations are not new.
1. Why are we here? The full meaning of this question is an instance of two-dimensional semantics, 
among several other questions considered by scientists, some of which raise the form of Anthropic 
principles. Here are the two questions: A. why are we here given that there was a big bang and things 
could have been different and then finally we existed? One answer: random chemical reactions. B. Why
are we here given that we exist (indeed solipsisticly in the extreme case)? One answer: God. 
2. AIs will find many blind spots. 
3. Politics. Theory: there is a spectrum of ways a person can live harmoniously with their surroundings.
The two extremes on this spectrum are 1. change the surroundings to suit the person. 2. change the 
person to suit the surroundings. The former impulse gives rise to conservatism, and the later impulse 
gives rise to liberalism.
4. I am not arguing or asserting the bible is fictitious. However, finding contradictions in the bible is 
somewhat like finding contradictions in the works of Shakespeare.
5. Feminism. They should take all of the TV shows for one day and switch the men and women: keep 
the same shows and writing but put women in the men’s roles and men in the women’s roles. Then they
should show all those TV shows for one day (at least).
6. What makes Bach the greatest composer is that he had the most fun of any composer in history.
7. Bach should be played on a clavichord tried in Remeau temperament to start with and not too fast 
and definitely not too slowly. A whole note in one piece does not necessarily equal a whole note in 
another piece (or even movement). Each voice should project. The player should be in a meditating 
and/or praying position. I am now convinced that ‘well-tempered’ does not mean ‘equal-tempered’.
8. I was as much of a fan of Wittgenstein as anyone. Now I think: ‘whereof we cannot speak, thereof 
we must be silent’: well, duh.
9. Derrida: language refers only to language. That’s stupid. If I was a university student I’d go ask for 
my money back.
10. Whatever free will is, when does thing X have as much (and same quality of) free will as thing Y? 
This question could also be addressed in age studies, feminist studies, race studies, international 
studies, history studies, cultural studies, mental illness studies, addiction studies, nature vs. nurture 
studies, etc.
11. How much information would it take to specify (i.e. to be) the state of affairs ‘the possibility of X 
exists’ and how much information would it take to specify the state of affairs ‘the possibility of X does 
not exist’ (that is, whether the possibility exists). A default state would be one requiring information of 
0, but it’s not clear if either of these have that. How much information would it take to specify the state 
of affairs ‘either the possibility exists or does not exist’? This does not necessarily require 0 
information either.
12. ‘All a cell wants to do is divide.’ Then possibly we should look to that process/structure to find the 
minimal physical correlates to the subjective experience of love (in the context of Dualism).
13. It may be possible to experience G, green qualia. If one subjectively has P(G) then one subjectively 
experiences the proposition P and green qualia. We may specify that if one has P(g) then one 
subjectively experiences the proposition P but not green qualia. If (if) the two P’s can be the same for 
any P then there are problems of verification, as is well-known in the philosophy of consciousness (e.g.
humans vs. zombies).
14. It is repeatable and falsifiable that sometimes at some stages of awareness after death one gets into 
the presence of intense unconditional love. A possible mechanism for this was given in previous 
Observations. The biggest most pressing problem facing humanity is: which people get there (and what
properties do they share) and which (if any) do not. This is a bigger more pressing problem than 
international peace, world hunger, global warming, etc. I stand by that. 
15. confelicity
16. Inter-subjective agreement (and consensus reality) is different than objective reality. And the latter 
requires more assumptions.
17. Is entropy objective or subjective? Both. It is subjective in that a human may chose to 
measure/calculate the entropy of a system at some decided-upon volume, for example 1 m3. But it is 
objective in that if space aliens came down and also measured/calculated the entropy of that system at 
the same 1 m3, they would get the same answer. On the other hand, a human may choose to measure at 
a resolution of 8 m3 and so (generically) get a different answer. But of course if space aliens chose to 
measure the same system at the same resolution they would get the same answer as we do.
18. The Lucus-Penrose thesis is that human minds can know things that finite mathematical procedures 
cannot in spite of the Godel incompleteness theorems. To put my cards on the table, I agree with this 
(as did Godel, as I understand it). Here is a theory that may or may not hold water. How do we know 
the truth of the true but unprovable sentence P from the formal system FS of e.g. Godel’s paper? 
Theory: The formal system’s terms refer only to numbers and, in a back-handed way, the formal 
system’s propositions. The system of our reasoning refers to numbers, propositions, maps between 
them, changes in all of these, and also other things in back-handed ways. Perhaps one place non-
provable truth could come in is in what we (humans) apply a supposed FS to: the terms and objects of 
the FS, and the arbitrariness and changeability of those applications and FS’s and terms and objects. 
(And surely the maps from the set P(S) of all subsets of S, where S is the (ill-defined) collection of FS’s
(machines?) to an object in mathematics (in the physical universe?) is non-computable. Indeed some of 
these maps could refer to other maps and, among many other things, one has the up-rise of non-well-
founded maps (sets).)
19. For a simple but interesting example (I’m probably not the first to suggest this example), suppose 
for formal system FS1 we get unprovable but true propositions P1. Then after 1 second adjoin 
(axiomatically) P1 to FS1 to get formal system FS2, which will have its own unprovable but true 
propositions P2. Then after ½ second adjoin P2 to FS2 to get FS3 … and so on, halving the time 
unprovable but true propositions are adjoined at each step. After 2 seconds do we have a complete 
formal system? I think so—it’s in the literature somewhere. It is not obvious, I claim, if a (quantum) 
machine could be constructed to do this for physical computability (I am not at all thinking one would 
have to rely on micro-tubules as in Penrose’s and Hammeroff’s early suggestion, but more abstractly—
see previous ‘Observations’ and ‘A Mechanism for Life after Death’).
20. Turing: non-computability might be introduced by occasional mistakes in computations. Godel: 
“...for example if the logic depends on the meaning of the terms…” (or whatever). This is exactly the 
kind of thing that happens in (13) and (24) and in two-dimensional semantics.
21. The idea that we are finite computers is absurd to begin with. The idea that consciousness is 
computations is self-evidently wrong—even if not obviously so.
22. Leibniz: it should be that this universe is the most varied one possible. Einstein: we want to know if
there are any alternatives to the existence of this universe.
23. With respect to non-locality, 1. Quantum mechanics is incomplete. 2. There can be no hidden 
variables that complete quantum mechanics. 3. Therefore, a complete theory must have non-hidden 
variables that quantum mechanics does not have. 4. The ‘now’ in the context of ‘future-‘now’-past’ (the
A-series) fulfills this role precisely, as I explained at length and used in several earlier papers (one of 
which is currently under review for publication, AGAIN), several of which are on PhilPapers.
How could it have been overlooked for so long? One reason is that there is a temptation to 
confuse, for example, green with a thought about green. The former is given by an experience of green.
The latter is given by an experience of a thought about. These two experiences are not the same 
experience and thus cannot be equated. 
Thus, the present cannot be equated to a thought about the present. For example, my present 
should not be confused with a (current) thought about a present that is 10 minutes in my future.
This is explained at length in earlier papers.
24. The answers to the Hard Problems, if there are any, must be experiences, as each question contains 
at least one quale. Part of the brain-correlates of the experiences will be able to be inferred from 
looking at the brain-correlates of the subjective experience of ‘this is an answer’ in such-and-such cases
and extrapolating. There is a different Hard Problem for each qualitatively different subjective 
experience.
25. One of the best attributes of string theory is its parsimoniousness: different particles are different 
vibrational modes of a single kind of thing—and ‘vibrational modes’ themselves are a single kind of 
thing. Moreover, these single kinds of things are related in a simple, familiar, and natural way. These 
profound points are often underappreciated.
Suppose string theory is right. Then wouldn’t it seem kind of silly to insist on experimental 
predictions at the current stage of things?
Is a particular kind of particle that is ‘frozen in time’--but that keeps its kind—given by the 
frozen state of the vibration or by the continuing vibrations in the mode? If the latter, two series of time
are needed.
26. Zen koan: what is your original face before your father and mother were born?
Jesus: before Abraham was, I am.
27. Alan Watts simply didn’t know what he was talking about and that’s all there is to it. Eckhart Toll 
knows what he’s talking about.
28. As of this writing, whenever physicists talk about time being an increase in entropy, they never 
address whether this is correlation only or if it is causation (post-McTaggart it is more complicated).
29. ‘I went to a restaurant that serves 'breakfast at any time'. So I ordered French Toast during the 
Renaissance.’
-Steven Wright
‘He asked me if I knew what time it was. I said, ‘Yes, but not right now.’’
 - Steven Wright
